1998- 2008 renewed risks for nuclear confrontation in South Asia?

Writing on my thesis proposal (nuclear safety and security measures in South Asia and Iran) - which is due today - I gave the current situation in South Asia some thought.

Stratfor already compared the Mumbai attacks to the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, providing the conclusion that the late incident if pursued by Muslim terrorists with links to Pakistan could provoke a similar confrontation as following the 2001 attack. Stratfor argued that pressure by the U.S. and India could have destabilizing effects for Pakistan.

As I believe this possibility to be valid and also believe that such a confrontation will most certainly have nuclear implications. I see a different issue looming.

But first let's look at the destabilizing effect. A destabilized Pakistan is never a good idea, not for NATO and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and especially not for domestic concerns, but even more so for the risk of nuclear terrorism. As the example of the Soviet Union has shown physical protection systems based on manpower fail in times of destabilized governments. With ever increasing terrorist activities in the region and seeing that the attacks in mumbai seemed very well planned and tactically conceived, it is highly likely that a similar group could overrun a nuclear facility in Pakistan, should the country destabilize more.

This might be inhibited by close ties between the Army and especially ISI with Islamic insurgents, providing training and possibly equipment. Further the military so far has a vast economic presence in Pakistan gaining extra-budgetary means from private sector enterprises. Further the Army is currently still receiving U.S. military aid. Both sources of non- gouvermental income could keep the military cohesiveness, without the risk of it breaking apart, thus keeping physical protection systems intact.

Nevertheless, Pakistan is not immune to the financial crisis and shifts in strategic interest. Should the financial crisis hit enterprises of the Pakistan Army, the government most likely will not be able to bail any of the foundations and companies out anymore. Further a change in outlook on the Pakistan/ Afghanistan problem by the Obama administration, resulting in less military aid, could seriously challenge the cohesiveness of the Pakistan Army.

A different risk however stems from increased pressure by India, the U.S. and possibly other players in the region.
Pakistan as Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid
argue is believing to be facing an anti- Pakistan alliance, which includes the United States, India, Russia and several other nations.

Especially in light of the recent ratification of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal which makes India highly superior to Pakistan, Pakistan’s Army could change it’s defense interest Increased pursue of its ballistic missile program and a change in nuclear posture from an Launch after Attack posture to a Launch on Warning posture provide for an increasing risk in the possibility of nuclear confrontation.

Considering the fragile and failure prone Intelligence systems in Pakistan changing the nuclear posture is intensifying the risk for accidental, inadvertent or unauthorized use of these nuclear weapons.

After the renewed positive relations between India and Pakistan since the election of Zardari as President of Pakistan, yesterdays incident has the potential of plunging the relations into the brink of war.

If, Pakistani sources have been somehow involved into the attacks it reminds strikingly of 1998, when India- Pakistan 'Bus diplomacy' was at its height, and the military began the Kargil Operation behind Nawaz Sharif's back.

Almost missed in the media - India's PM in Washington - change in nuclear race in South Asia???

Three topics seem to preoccupy the media outlets at this Friday the 26th. Either the bailout negotiations, and McCain/Obama's take in them. The Debate, or well in foreign policy there is the border situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan and especially US Forces being shot at by Pakistani forces. Pakistan's president discusses the latest incident with Condolezza Rice. Sure there is some more going on in the world today, but this seems to be pretty much the big stories.

But for all those interested in South Asia, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and maybe World Peace, there is a story that almost none of the big media outlets cover. India's Prime Minister was in Washington, discussing partly the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Though, Bush and Singh could not sign the deal yet, as Congress needs to ratify the deal both leaders hammered through in 2005. But, Congress might pass the deal in this Session. This will alter the strategic security situation in South Asia to a large extend. Especially in regards to Pakistan.

The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal will draw India and the U.S. closer as strategic partners, which is not a welcome change for Pakistan, which relies heavily on U.S. military help. But even more disturbing for India- Pakistan relationship, this would enable India to buy fissile material overseas, not having to rely on its own fissile material mines. India, which will then have enough fissile material for civilian used nuclear facilities, can use its indigenous resources for upgrading it to weapons grade plutonium, furthermore the spend fuel from the civilian reactors can also be enriched to weapons grade material, giving India the possibility to cash in twice.

This will further alter the assymetric character of the nuclear standoff in South Asia, eventually triggering a renewed nuclear Arms race. On top of that the Pakistani military might change its nuclear posture, to a Launch on Warning posture, leading to a mating of the warheads with the means of delivery. Thus increasing the risk of accidents or inadvertent and unauthorized launches of the nuclear weapons. Making thus increasing a risk of accidental nuclear war dramatically.

The civilian government in Pakistan urgently needs external and internal efforts to cut the Pakistani Army's grip on politics. A renewed nuclear step forward by India in this regard will only enhance the fears of the Pakistani Army that India is its number one threat, thus tightening a grip on the politicians, or maybe as in 1998 (Kargil crisis) begin a war without the civilian governments backing.

What Pakistan and South Asia would need right now is an effort for peace in the region. Getting a triadic peace agreement between the West, India and Pakistan going. A deal on no further aggressions and an effort to defuse the Kashmir problem. This will not only enhance Peace itself but also curb the Pakistani Army's iron grip, and thus help the democracy in Pakistan, which as a reward could only prove beneficial for Pakistan's northern frontier.

Indo- U.S. nuclear deal halted

As Reuters reports the Indo- U.S. nuclear deal will not be ratified by Congress as planned before January.

The U.S. Congress will not have time to approve a landmark civilian nuclear agreement with India at the center of a bitter Indian political row, a key U.S. lawmaker on South Asian affairs said on Tuesday.

The deal was meant to bring India and the U.S. closer together in its nuclear power and would have had serious implications for South Asia and the World.


The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has more facets: On the one hand it gives India the chance to use U.S. nuclear fuel, it basically formally acknowledges India as a nuclear weapons states without having signed the NPT and gives the U.S. in return a little more leverage over India's nuclear program, by putting civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. This certainly is a positive effect, since it would make India a safer ground fro nuclear technology, helping to achieve at least a minimum level of safety and security.

But it also gives India the chance to end its heavy reliance on their own uranium sources, which could be used to produce weapons grade uranium and plutonium in military and strategic reactors that won't be under safeguards.

An Indian official announced after the U.S.-India deal in 2005: “The truth is we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end of 2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear program. 10 India ran out of uranium and putting nuclear reactors under safeguards opens India to the international nuclear fuel cycle thus providing it access to uranium. But most of the reactors are not going to be under safeguards until 2010 or 2014, from the spend fuel those civilian facilities produce, India could produce from 2007 about 4274 kg reactor grade plutonium. “Meanwhile the military reactors could keep producing 1250 kg of plutonium a year. (paragraph copied from own paper)

Especially the later point of gaining the ability to produce weapons grade plutonium from spend fuel, will give India a critical advantage over its adversary Pakistan, which already struggles to follow up in this neighbour nuclear arms race.

Stephen Cohen (Brookings) and Lisa Curtis (Heritage Foundation) said a setback to the nuclear deal would not derail bilateral ties. But in addition to the time needed for a transition to a new U.S. administration, Bush's successor might pause before going to bat for India again.

In fact the Indo- U.S. nuclear deal might pause not only until spring next year, but maybe even until Bush's predecessor got accustomed to dealing with South Asia and having understood the importance of this issue. More urgent policy decisions (Iraq, taxes, health care) will most likely postpone decisions on South Asia for a while.

This does not necessarily have to be negative for South Asia. Despite the risks of nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities being unsafe and not secured enough, in terms of Confidence Building Measures with Pakistan, a delay of tis deal could make time for a deal being hammered out with Pakistan, bringing all three parties on a table to halt the increasing speed of the South Asian nuclear arms race.

Disarmament, Withdrawal and NPT - necessary or obsolete?

Solana, Iran and Harmon

Seemingly the topic of the week is set. Javier Solana the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy spoke at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on Wednesday June 25th.

Some paragrahps from his speech that can be found here

"Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are enormous challenges for the international community."

"But, if truth be told, the last ten years have been a "lost decade". When the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke to you at the opening of the 2008 session, he made clear that he was deeply troubled by the lack of progress. I fully share his view. It is puzzling that during an entire decade and despite enormous efforts, there is still no agreement even on the question of how to address the issues and in which order. "

All this talks of dismarmanent and withdrawal in Europe is framed with by Iran's latest comments on their nuclear enrichment program. The Islamic Republic once again pressures the West to engage in discussion before its too late.

"Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran's parliament and a former nuclear negotiator, said there was "only a little time left" for talks before Iran would make unspecified moves that the West would regret."

"Don't provoke Iran otherwise you will face a done deal that will block the path of your return to a compromise with Iran," Larijani told an open session of the parliament broadcast live on state radio Wednesday.

"We advise U.S. officials to be careful not to face another tragedy," Mohammed Hejazi, an official in the military's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Wednesday, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. "If you want to move toward Iran, make sure you bring walking sticks and artificial legs because if you come, you will not have any legs to return on."

"The United States has to realize that they cannot resolve all their problems through aggression and force," Khatami said at a conference in Oslo promoting dialogue between the Islamic world and the West.

With that Khatami unfortunately is right on. The dire warnings need to be seen in the context of a Israeli military exercise, which were claimed by U.S. officials as message to Iran.

"Even if Iran's nuclear facilities are totally destroyed — a possibility that is precisely zero — it will easily be revived within a short period of time, but with the difference that it may prompt a fundamental reconsideration in intentions," the daily Kayhan said in an editorial. "

Especially the later comment is interesting as Iran always claimed that the Enrichment of uranium would only be for civilian intentions. This does certainly not mean that despite their claims weaponizing the nuclear program wasn't the overall hidden agenda of Iran's leadership. But ironically the the rethoric of a preemptive war against Iran if they do not stop weaponizing, has granted the Islamic Republic with a preliminary almost legal justification for doing just that. They can even do it publically.

More on this can be found here and here

Despite Solana's trust in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the vehicle for disarmament there are voices that raise concern about the usefulness of the NPT . Congresswoman Harmon wrote on June 20th in the Wall Street Journal, arguing rightly so, that the NPT standards are obsolete in a world where North Korea and Iran can proliferate under the umbrella of the NPT.

Today's legal regime is no match for the wide dissemination of nuclear technology. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) standards are obsolete, and the growth in the sheer number of nuclear facilities world-wide has made it difficult for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to achieve its mission.

Moreover, the NPT cuts most of the world out of the nuclear weapons club. It grandfathered in states that had nuclear weapons before 1967, and said that only they could keep them. Given the skyrocketing demand for alternatives to oil, we have to expect that more countries will want to develop nuclear energy. We need a system that allows states to pursue nuclear energy but prevents them from developing nuclear weapons under the radar.

A more promising approach might be to create an international consortium of fuel centers that provide enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel, and end-to-end oversight of nuclear resources. Driven by market demand, private companies could operate facilities with IAEA oversight, and participating states would agree not to engage in independent enriching and reprocessing. Material would be purchased from the international market, thereby creating supply assurance for nations who fear being denied fuel.

This concept is a private-sector version of the International Nuclear Fuel Authority envisioned by Sens. Richard Lugar and Evan Bayh, and could borrow from the low-enriched uranium "emergency" stockpile concept proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Harmon raises some interesting questions and even more so possible ways to deal with the problem.

At least some good news can be read in the last few days:
In the case of North Korea it seems that after years of verbal assaults and sanctions by the Bush Administration the last two years have proven fruitful, As yesterday North Korea made the symbolic act of destroying the cooling tower at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang. The facility has been used for enrichment of plutonium. Unfortunately the critics may be right, it came too late, since North Korea had enough time to produce enough weapons grade plutonium for nuclear warheads, and test a detonation and the missiles to deliver the warheads. Yet it does show a major achievement in diplomatic relations between the two countries, and maybe even a shift in U.S. foreign policy, one that the following president should embrace and enhance. (See post on Zakaria and Obama)
Nice blog on this topic also on: Duck of Minerva

Nuke withdrawal and safety - glance at Europe's nuclear arsenal

Nuclear weapons and their Security and Safety in the U.K., Europe.

This topic will become somewhat of a series on this Blog, due to my personal academic interest in this field.

Yesterday June 26th the Federation of American Scientists reported about the quiet withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from bases in England on their blog. According to this, the United States has withdrawn nuclear weapons from the Royal Air Force Lakenheath air base, some 70 miles notheast of England.
This came as a series of withdrawals of nuclear weapons, following the withdrawals of those based at the U.S.A.F. Base Ramstein in Germany in 2005 and Greece in 2001.

This leaves another six European bases, two in Italy, one each in Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey where nuclear weapons are currently stored. Except one in Italy and the one in Turkey the nuclear weapons are stored on non- U.S.A.F. bases.
According to FAS this withdrawal happened at the same time as a U.S. State Department visit to Moscow Arguing about " who had done enough to reduce its non-startegic nuclear weapons.

The officially not announced withdrawal, was confirmed by U.S. government sources. It comes at a crucial moment in time. As On June 19th FAS reported on a U.S.A.F. investigation (Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures (BRR)published on February 8th, 2008), which found that

“host nation security at overseas nuclear-capable units varies from country to country in terms of personnel, facilities, and equipment.” The report describes that “inconsistencies in personnel, facilities, and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation were evident as the team traveled from site to site….Examples of areas noted in need of repair at several of the sites include support buildings, fencing, lighting, and security systems.”

According to FAS

"A news story on a USAF web site notes that the weapons security issues found by the BRR investigation were “at other bases,” suggesting that Büchel Air Base in Germany or Ghedi Torre Air Base in Italy were the problem. Even so, the BRR found problems at “most sites,” visits to Kleine Brogel and Volkel were described in the context of these findings."

The report showed that personnel, with as little as 9months experience was guarding the weapons. This would pose serious risks to the safety and security of nuclear weapons. Misuse due to improper training, handling or assembly of nuclear warheads poses one of the highest risk to nuclear weapons.

The report has triggered enormous protest by German politicians calling for a withdrawal of the nuclear weapons. Despite the Christ democrats (CDU), the coalition partner of the CDU, the SPD and the opposition have called for a withdrawal of the weapons. "The nuclear weapons are remnants of the Cold War and have to perish". The Foreign Policy Spokesperson of the Christ Democrats answered: " As long as nuclear weapons exist on this world, we cannot abdicate them. They protect us" [orginial article in German by Sueddeutsche Zeitung ]

The questions whether nuclear weapons are a useful deterrent for German national security is surely something worth discussing But, what the German politicians failed to acknowledge in this rhethorical blame game is the security related subtext of these findings. The obvious question behind these findings hints at the poor German Air Force command and control structure in place. After all the U.S. nuclear wwarheads in Germany are guarded, handled and deployed in a nuclear war by German personnel on a German Air Force Base. And they are not just unsafe since the BRR report came out, they have been so for quite some time. Obviously not only the warheads themselves are remnants of the Cold War the safety structures seem to be as well. If the answer of the German Bundestag will be to keep the nuclear warheads on German soil, the German Defense Ministry needs to address this issue rather fast.

Just at the same time a new declassified safety manual by Britains Ministry of Defence (MoD) raises concern about British submarine based nuclear warheads running risk of "popcorning" - (exploding one after the other).

The MoD manual states:

"the standard single-point design [keeps a nuclear weapon from detonation despite external shocks] may not be enough to prevent "popcorning" – a disastrous chain reaction of explosions that could occur as a result of warheads being stacked closely together."

As Sagan has shown in 1993, nuclear accidents are highly possible even in the U.S. system. Normal Accident theory has long challenged the safety of nuclear weapons and the above mentioned evidence unfortunately underlines these claims. The question I have in mind though is, if countries like the U.S. and other NATO member states are not able to provide adequate security and safety measures for their nuclear weapons arsenal, how much graver is the risk in non- high-tech countries, such as Pakistan or India?
I believe that South Asia runs an extraordinary high risk of accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and this could cause an accidental nuclear war in this region. Another question in mind, in this respect is certainly, why the U.S. is the only nation engaged in this region when it comes to discussions, establishment of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) or technology transfer with both countries. No matter what happens an accidental nuclear war or terrorist acquiring HEU for use in a - dirty bomb (RDD), Europe would most certainly be among the first to be hit by the repercussions and possible side effects of a nuclear war or nuclear terrorism. Yet Europe has only shown some interest in the discussion about Iran's nuclear program, but not on Pakistan's which happens to be Irans unstable neighbour and supplier of nuclear technology.