1998- 2008 renewed risks for nuclear confrontation in South Asia?

Writing on my thesis proposal (nuclear safety and security measures in South Asia and Iran) - which is due today - I gave the current situation in South Asia some thought.

Stratfor already compared the Mumbai attacks to the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, providing the conclusion that the late incident if pursued by Muslim terrorists with links to Pakistan could provoke a similar confrontation as following the 2001 attack. Stratfor argued that pressure by the U.S. and India could have destabilizing effects for Pakistan.

As I believe this possibility to be valid and also believe that such a confrontation will most certainly have nuclear implications. I see a different issue looming.

But first let's look at the destabilizing effect. A destabilized Pakistan is never a good idea, not for NATO and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and especially not for domestic concerns, but even more so for the risk of nuclear terrorism. As the example of the Soviet Union has shown physical protection systems based on manpower fail in times of destabilized governments. With ever increasing terrorist activities in the region and seeing that the attacks in mumbai seemed very well planned and tactically conceived, it is highly likely that a similar group could overrun a nuclear facility in Pakistan, should the country destabilize more.

This might be inhibited by close ties between the Army and especially ISI with Islamic insurgents, providing training and possibly equipment. Further the military so far has a vast economic presence in Pakistan gaining extra-budgetary means from private sector enterprises. Further the Army is currently still receiving U.S. military aid. Both sources of non- gouvermental income could keep the military cohesiveness, without the risk of it breaking apart, thus keeping physical protection systems intact.

Nevertheless, Pakistan is not immune to the financial crisis and shifts in strategic interest. Should the financial crisis hit enterprises of the Pakistan Army, the government most likely will not be able to bail any of the foundations and companies out anymore. Further a change in outlook on the Pakistan/ Afghanistan problem by the Obama administration, resulting in less military aid, could seriously challenge the cohesiveness of the Pakistan Army.

A different risk however stems from increased pressure by India, the U.S. and possibly other players in the region.
Pakistan as Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid
argue is believing to be facing an anti- Pakistan alliance, which includes the United States, India, Russia and several other nations.

Especially in light of the recent ratification of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal which makes India highly superior to Pakistan, Pakistan’s Army could change it’s defense interest Increased pursue of its ballistic missile program and a change in nuclear posture from an Launch after Attack posture to a Launch on Warning posture provide for an increasing risk in the possibility of nuclear confrontation.

Considering the fragile and failure prone Intelligence systems in Pakistan changing the nuclear posture is intensifying the risk for accidental, inadvertent or unauthorized use of these nuclear weapons.

After the renewed positive relations between India and Pakistan since the election of Zardari as President of Pakistan, yesterdays incident has the potential of plunging the relations into the brink of war.

If, Pakistani sources have been somehow involved into the attacks it reminds strikingly of 1998, when India- Pakistan 'Bus diplomacy' was at its height, and the military began the Kargil Operation behind Nawaz Sharif's back.

Almost missed in the media - India's PM in Washington - change in nuclear race in South Asia???

Three topics seem to preoccupy the media outlets at this Friday the 26th. Either the bailout negotiations, and McCain/Obama's take in them. The Debate, or well in foreign policy there is the border situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan and especially US Forces being shot at by Pakistani forces. Pakistan's president discusses the latest incident with Condolezza Rice. Sure there is some more going on in the world today, but this seems to be pretty much the big stories.

But for all those interested in South Asia, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and maybe World Peace, there is a story that almost none of the big media outlets cover. India's Prime Minister was in Washington, discussing partly the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Though, Bush and Singh could not sign the deal yet, as Congress needs to ratify the deal both leaders hammered through in 2005. But, Congress might pass the deal in this Session. This will alter the strategic security situation in South Asia to a large extend. Especially in regards to Pakistan.

The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal will draw India and the U.S. closer as strategic partners, which is not a welcome change for Pakistan, which relies heavily on U.S. military help. But even more disturbing for India- Pakistan relationship, this would enable India to buy fissile material overseas, not having to rely on its own fissile material mines. India, which will then have enough fissile material for civilian used nuclear facilities, can use its indigenous resources for upgrading it to weapons grade plutonium, furthermore the spend fuel from the civilian reactors can also be enriched to weapons grade material, giving India the possibility to cash in twice.

This will further alter the assymetric character of the nuclear standoff in South Asia, eventually triggering a renewed nuclear Arms race. On top of that the Pakistani military might change its nuclear posture, to a Launch on Warning posture, leading to a mating of the warheads with the means of delivery. Thus increasing the risk of accidents or inadvertent and unauthorized launches of the nuclear weapons. Making thus increasing a risk of accidental nuclear war dramatically.

The civilian government in Pakistan urgently needs external and internal efforts to cut the Pakistani Army's grip on politics. A renewed nuclear step forward by India in this regard will only enhance the fears of the Pakistani Army that India is its number one threat, thus tightening a grip on the politicians, or maybe as in 1998 (Kargil crisis) begin a war without the civilian governments backing.

What Pakistan and South Asia would need right now is an effort for peace in the region. Getting a triadic peace agreement between the West, India and Pakistan going. A deal on no further aggressions and an effort to defuse the Kashmir problem. This will not only enhance Peace itself but also curb the Pakistani Army's iron grip, and thus help the democracy in Pakistan, which as a reward could only prove beneficial for Pakistan's northern frontier.

Islamabad bombing and change of strategy

Troy of abu muqawama posted on the Marriott bombing in Islamabad
and raised some interesting questions:

* In the wake of the most significant act of terrorism in the capital, will the new government’s approach to terrorism and militancy mirror the path taken by Musharraf following the Lal Masjid siege? A corollary to this question is, of course, how much control does the new government have over the military and the ISI? You can find one answer to that latter question here.

* Will this attack have any effect on Pakistani perceptions of the Tehrik-e-Taliban? The Mariott was certainly a “western” target, yet hundreds of Pakistanis (admittedly upper-class and/or government types) were reportedly breaking their Ramadan fast in the hotel’s restaurants. Could this have an effect on Pakistani public opinion, which has been rather ambivalent about the domestic danger posed by the Pakistani Taliban?

* What, if any, is the cause and effect relationship with the recent spate of cross border attacks by the U.S. on militant base areas inside Pakistan? Could this attack indicate that the raids, controversial though they may be, are actually having enough of an effect that the Pakistani Taliban feel the need to escalate their violence in an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the government to halt the practice?

Undoubtedly the questions have merit, yet I find them a bit narrow. The new civilian government as much as Bhutto and Sharif before, has no real power over the military. The military is very much the only structured institution in Pakistan and sees itself despite four failed attempts as the only force capable of ruling the country.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi wrote an interesting piece on the effects of U.S. cross border interventions in an editorial in the Daily Times

"If the military comes to the conclusion that the civilian government is not able to adopt effective diplomatic measures, it may either mount pressure to push the government to action, change civilian leaders in power, or completely displace the civilian government."

Lacking the support of the Chief of Army Staff Kayani, Zardari has no grip on the military. Any support for the overall COIN mission in the NWFP by Zardari can only be rhetorical. Just as much as his interest in clamping down on terrorists. The support on the ground by Pakistani troops comes only after the military establishments choosing. To clamp down on domestic and foreign terrorists inside Pakistan Zardari needs to either establish well functioning relationships with the military (a hard task by itself) or try to cut down the military's influence by establishing formal civil military relations. (Almost impossible and a very loooooong- term task)

Further, if I'm not mistaken, no terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the attacks yet. Pakistan has a lot of Islamist groups and a lot Islamist terrorist cells. Clearly some have contact to the Taliban and or Al Qaeda due to the close connections with ISI. The Taliban are strategically bound in the NWFP. Any Islamist terrorist group can be responsible for this attack. And the Pakistani public is well aware of the threat of terrorism, especially since Benazir Bhutto's assasination. (In my eyes the sole reason Zardari was elected). Also how much intel is available yet that the attack was not directed at the Government buildings where Zardari dined with leaders of government?

The third question leads us to a different question. What will be the gains of U.S. operations conducted in the NWFP? I would suggest that any effect of the U.S. military in Pakistan will be short term and will only have the long term effects of an increase in Anti- American sentiments. Despite Pakistan's long term alliance and reliance with the U.S. the Pakistanis have always followed their own strategic golas and while cashing in on all of the offers by the U.S. in military and development aid, were reluctant to come up with their side of the agreements. The Pakistani establishing, while relying on the U.S. and keeping close contact did not hinder public anti U.S. rallies domestically. Quite to the contrary, while sending troops to Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm many military and government leaders were in fact pro Saddam. Openly mistreating Pakistan's sovereignty will further increase this anti- U.S. sentiment in the Pakistani public and in return could and most certainly will after time have the above quoted effect of the military establishment trying to push Zardari out of government and might even take over.

As Stephen Cohen noted in his book: “The idea of Pakistan”:

The events of September 11 affected Pakistan more than any other Muslim state except Afghanistan, yet prompted little domestic change."

The future of Pakistan and Afghanistan are intermingled and both can't be dealt with by military means. To deal with the insurgency in Afghanistan will mean the U.S. and the West will have to adopt different strategies for Pakistan:

- The U.S. needs to stop the support of the Pakistan military. The continuing U.S. support for Pakistani military has already led to as Husaim Haqqani notes in "Pakistan between Mosque and Military" the overestimation of the Pakistani Army's power potential and to a rentier state mentality.

- Aid programs must be directed at economic and democratic development in Pakistan. Until the 2002 election no Islamist party could gain more than 10% of the actual votes (Both Sharif and Bhutto were ousted in that election), thus showing that the Pakistani public is despite islamist identity voting secular parties addressing social issues.

- The U.S. needs to step up in an effort to address Pakistani threat perceptions. The number one external threat for the Pakistani public has been for years the fear of an Indian attack. (The nuclear program and the covert operations against Indian territory in Afghanistan or Kahsmir are meant to deter India.) In order to minimize Pakistani military influence and change the regional set up. Pakistan and India need to agree on Confidence Building Measures and first and foremost on a no attack agreement. In the long run Kashmir needs to be discussed.

As long as the Pakistani military establishment keeps the country hijacked, the region will stay unstable at best and going down a spiral of violence at worst. To change the domestic set up of Pakistan is critically intermingled with success in Afghanistan.

Update: C. Raja Mohan wrote a pretty neat piece on Bush's and Pakistan's future worth reading.

Indo- U.S. nuclear deal halted

As Reuters reports the Indo- U.S. nuclear deal will not be ratified by Congress as planned before January.

The U.S. Congress will not have time to approve a landmark civilian nuclear agreement with India at the center of a bitter Indian political row, a key U.S. lawmaker on South Asian affairs said on Tuesday.

The deal was meant to bring India and the U.S. closer together in its nuclear power and would have had serious implications for South Asia and the World.


The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has more facets: On the one hand it gives India the chance to use U.S. nuclear fuel, it basically formally acknowledges India as a nuclear weapons states without having signed the NPT and gives the U.S. in return a little more leverage over India's nuclear program, by putting civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. This certainly is a positive effect, since it would make India a safer ground fro nuclear technology, helping to achieve at least a minimum level of safety and security.

But it also gives India the chance to end its heavy reliance on their own uranium sources, which could be used to produce weapons grade uranium and plutonium in military and strategic reactors that won't be under safeguards.

An Indian official announced after the U.S.-India deal in 2005: “The truth is we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end of 2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear program. 10 India ran out of uranium and putting nuclear reactors under safeguards opens India to the international nuclear fuel cycle thus providing it access to uranium. But most of the reactors are not going to be under safeguards until 2010 or 2014, from the spend fuel those civilian facilities produce, India could produce from 2007 about 4274 kg reactor grade plutonium. “Meanwhile the military reactors could keep producing 1250 kg of plutonium a year. (paragraph copied from own paper)

Especially the later point of gaining the ability to produce weapons grade plutonium from spend fuel, will give India a critical advantage over its adversary Pakistan, which already struggles to follow up in this neighbour nuclear arms race.

Stephen Cohen (Brookings) and Lisa Curtis (Heritage Foundation) said a setback to the nuclear deal would not derail bilateral ties. But in addition to the time needed for a transition to a new U.S. administration, Bush's successor might pause before going to bat for India again.

In fact the Indo- U.S. nuclear deal might pause not only until spring next year, but maybe even until Bush's predecessor got accustomed to dealing with South Asia and having understood the importance of this issue. More urgent policy decisions (Iraq, taxes, health care) will most likely postpone decisions on South Asia for a while.

This does not necessarily have to be negative for South Asia. Despite the risks of nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities being unsafe and not secured enough, in terms of Confidence Building Measures with Pakistan, a delay of tis deal could make time for a deal being hammered out with Pakistan, bringing all three parties on a table to halt the increasing speed of the South Asian nuclear arms race.