This topic will become somewhat of a series on this Blog, due to my personal academic interest in this field.
Yesterday June 26th the Federation of American Scientists reported about the quiet withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from bases in England on their blog. According to this, the United States has withdrawn nuclear weapons from the Royal Air Force Lakenheath air base, some 70 miles notheast of England.
This came as a series of withdrawals of nuclear weapons, following the withdrawals of those based at the U.S.A.F. Base Ramstein in Germany in 2005 and Greece in 2001.
This leaves another six European bases, two in Italy, one each in Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey where nuclear weapons are currently stored. Except one in Italy and the one in Turkey the nuclear weapons are stored on non- U.S.A.F. bases.
According to FAS this withdrawal happened at the same time as a U.S. State Department visit to Moscow Arguing about " who had done enough to reduce its non-startegic nuclear weapons.
The officially not announced withdrawal, was confirmed by U.S. government sources. It comes at a crucial moment in time. As On June 19th FAS reported on a U.S.A.F. investigation (Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures (BRR)published on February 8th, 2008), which found that
“host nation security at overseas nuclear-capable units varies from country to country in terms of personnel, facilities, and equipment.” The report describes that “inconsistencies in personnel, facilities, and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation were evident as the team traveled from site to site….Examples of areas noted in need of repair at several of the sites include support buildings, fencing, lighting, and security systems.”
According to FAS
"A news story on a USAF web site notes that the weapons security issues found by the BRR investigation were “at other bases,” suggesting that Büchel Air Base in Germany or Ghedi Torre Air Base in Italy were the problem. Even so, the BRR found problems at “most sites,” visits to Kleine Brogel and Volkel were described in the context of these findings."
The report showed that personnel, with as little as 9months experience was guarding the weapons. This would pose serious risks to the safety and security of nuclear weapons. Misuse due to improper training, handling or assembly of nuclear warheads poses one of the highest risk to nuclear weapons.
The report has triggered enormous protest by German politicians calling for a withdrawal of the nuclear weapons. Despite the Christ democrats (CDU), the coalition partner of the CDU, the SPD and the opposition have called for a withdrawal of the weapons. "The nuclear weapons are remnants of the Cold War and have to perish". The Foreign Policy Spokesperson of the Christ Democrats answered: " As long as nuclear weapons exist on this world, we cannot abdicate them. They protect us" [orginial article in German by Sueddeutsche Zeitung ]
The questions whether nuclear weapons are a useful deterrent for German national security is surely something worth discussing But, what the German politicians failed to acknowledge in this rhethorical blame game is the security related subtext of these findings. The obvious question behind these findings hints at the poor German Air Force command and control structure in place. After all the U.S. nuclear wwarheads in Germany are guarded, handled and deployed in a nuclear war by German personnel on a German Air Force Base. And they are not just unsafe since the BRR report came out, they have been so for quite some time. Obviously not only the warheads themselves are remnants of the Cold War the safety structures seem to be as well. If the answer of the German Bundestag will be to keep the nuclear warheads on German soil, the German Defense Ministry needs to address this issue rather fast.
Just at the same time a new declassified safety manual by Britains Ministry of Defence (MoD) raises concern about British submarine based nuclear warheads running risk of "popcorning" - (exploding one after the other).
The MoD manual states:
"the standard single-point design [keeps a nuclear weapon from detonation despite external shocks] may not be enough to prevent "popcorning" – a disastrous chain reaction of explosions that could occur as a result of warheads being stacked closely together."
As Sagan has shown in 1993, nuclear accidents are highly possible even in the U.S. system. Normal Accident theory has long challenged the safety of nuclear weapons and the above mentioned evidence unfortunately underlines these claims. The question I have in mind though is, if countries like the U.S. and other NATO member states are not able to provide adequate security and safety measures for their nuclear weapons arsenal, how much graver is the risk in non- high-tech countries, such as Pakistan or India?
I believe that South Asia runs an extraordinary high risk of accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and this could cause an accidental nuclear war in this region. Another question in mind, in this respect is certainly, why the U.S. is the only nation engaged in this region when it comes to discussions, establishment of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) or technology transfer with both countries. No matter what happens an accidental nuclear war or terrorist acquiring HEU for use in a - dirty bomb (RDD), Europe would most certainly be among the first to be hit by the repercussions and possible side effects of a nuclear war or nuclear terrorism. Yet Europe has only shown some interest in the discussion about Iran's nuclear program, but not on Pakistan's which happens to be Irans unstable neighbour and supplier of nuclear technology.
No comments:
Post a Comment