Who's leading who in Iran??

As reported by one of my not so favorite news agencies: Xinhua. But I'll be coming to the issue of China soon enough.
Nevertheless, Commander of Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari warned Israel on Saturday in an Iranian newspaper:

Israel "is completely within the range of the Islamic republic's missiles" and it cannot confront Iran's missile power, Jafari told Iran's Jam-e Jam newspaper.

"The enemy possibly wants to delay our nuclear activities by attacking our nuclear sites, but any interruption would be very short since Iranian scientific ability is different from that of Syria and Iraq," he said.

As I already blogged yesterday:

"We advise U.S. officials to be careful not to face another tragedy," Mohammed Hejazi, an official in the military's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Wednesday, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. "If you want to move toward Iran, make sure you bring walking sticks and artificial legs because if you come, you will not have any legs to return on."

Interestingly enough no major Western media outlet seems to recognize the fact how factionalized the Iranian state is.

It must be noted that the Revolutionary Guard is only a part of the Military establishment, but the fact that the Revolutionary Guard issues warnings towards Israel and the U.S. by themselves shows how split the power set up is in Iran.

The head of state is Ali Hoseini-Khameini, the Grand Ayatollah (since 4 June 1989), he's also the chief of staff when it comes to a war. The head of government: President Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD (since 3 August 2005). Traditionally the Ayatollah is opposed to the President and this could be seen in recent months. The Revolutionary Guard seems to be closer to the Grand Ayatollah but at the moment it seems a bit unclear on which side of the wall the Revolutionary Guard will come down. Another faction that always seems to have some say in political matters is the Ulama the clergy (appointing the Grand Ayatollah and thus holding a very influential part in politics).

Anyways the interesting fact here is that Iran in fact is not one homogeneous country. The Revolutionary Guard, the Grand Ayatollah, the President all have own interests. It might be interesting to follow Iran's future statements in this light, instead of believing in the myth of a monolithic state.

Thanks to my web designer!

I just wanted to thank my friend Sidra Mahmood for designing the new template of this Blog. Thank you very much you did a great job!

Disarmament, Withdrawal and NPT - necessary or obsolete?

Solana, Iran and Harmon

Seemingly the topic of the week is set. Javier Solana the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy spoke at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on Wednesday June 25th.

Some paragrahps from his speech that can be found here

"Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are enormous challenges for the international community."

"But, if truth be told, the last ten years have been a "lost decade". When the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke to you at the opening of the 2008 session, he made clear that he was deeply troubled by the lack of progress. I fully share his view. It is puzzling that during an entire decade and despite enormous efforts, there is still no agreement even on the question of how to address the issues and in which order. "

All this talks of dismarmanent and withdrawal in Europe is framed with by Iran's latest comments on their nuclear enrichment program. The Islamic Republic once again pressures the West to engage in discussion before its too late.

"Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran's parliament and a former nuclear negotiator, said there was "only a little time left" for talks before Iran would make unspecified moves that the West would regret."

"Don't provoke Iran otherwise you will face a done deal that will block the path of your return to a compromise with Iran," Larijani told an open session of the parliament broadcast live on state radio Wednesday.

"We advise U.S. officials to be careful not to face another tragedy," Mohammed Hejazi, an official in the military's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Wednesday, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. "If you want to move toward Iran, make sure you bring walking sticks and artificial legs because if you come, you will not have any legs to return on."

"The United States has to realize that they cannot resolve all their problems through aggression and force," Khatami said at a conference in Oslo promoting dialogue between the Islamic world and the West.

With that Khatami unfortunately is right on. The dire warnings need to be seen in the context of a Israeli military exercise, which were claimed by U.S. officials as message to Iran.

"Even if Iran's nuclear facilities are totally destroyed — a possibility that is precisely zero — it will easily be revived within a short period of time, but with the difference that it may prompt a fundamental reconsideration in intentions," the daily Kayhan said in an editorial. "

Especially the later comment is interesting as Iran always claimed that the Enrichment of uranium would only be for civilian intentions. This does certainly not mean that despite their claims weaponizing the nuclear program wasn't the overall hidden agenda of Iran's leadership. But ironically the the rethoric of a preemptive war against Iran if they do not stop weaponizing, has granted the Islamic Republic with a preliminary almost legal justification for doing just that. They can even do it publically.

More on this can be found here and here

Despite Solana's trust in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the vehicle for disarmament there are voices that raise concern about the usefulness of the NPT . Congresswoman Harmon wrote on June 20th in the Wall Street Journal, arguing rightly so, that the NPT standards are obsolete in a world where North Korea and Iran can proliferate under the umbrella of the NPT.

Today's legal regime is no match for the wide dissemination of nuclear technology. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) standards are obsolete, and the growth in the sheer number of nuclear facilities world-wide has made it difficult for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to achieve its mission.

Moreover, the NPT cuts most of the world out of the nuclear weapons club. It grandfathered in states that had nuclear weapons before 1967, and said that only they could keep them. Given the skyrocketing demand for alternatives to oil, we have to expect that more countries will want to develop nuclear energy. We need a system that allows states to pursue nuclear energy but prevents them from developing nuclear weapons under the radar.

A more promising approach might be to create an international consortium of fuel centers that provide enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel, and end-to-end oversight of nuclear resources. Driven by market demand, private companies could operate facilities with IAEA oversight, and participating states would agree not to engage in independent enriching and reprocessing. Material would be purchased from the international market, thereby creating supply assurance for nations who fear being denied fuel.

This concept is a private-sector version of the International Nuclear Fuel Authority envisioned by Sens. Richard Lugar and Evan Bayh, and could borrow from the low-enriched uranium "emergency" stockpile concept proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Harmon raises some interesting questions and even more so possible ways to deal with the problem.

At least some good news can be read in the last few days:
In the case of North Korea it seems that after years of verbal assaults and sanctions by the Bush Administration the last two years have proven fruitful, As yesterday North Korea made the symbolic act of destroying the cooling tower at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang. The facility has been used for enrichment of plutonium. Unfortunately the critics may be right, it came too late, since North Korea had enough time to produce enough weapons grade plutonium for nuclear warheads, and test a detonation and the missiles to deliver the warheads. Yet it does show a major achievement in diplomatic relations between the two countries, and maybe even a shift in U.S. foreign policy, one that the following president should embrace and enhance. (See post on Zakaria and Obama)
Nice blog on this topic also on: Duck of Minerva

Nuke withdrawal and safety - glance at Europe's nuclear arsenal

Nuclear weapons and their Security and Safety in the U.K., Europe.

This topic will become somewhat of a series on this Blog, due to my personal academic interest in this field.

Yesterday June 26th the Federation of American Scientists reported about the quiet withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from bases in England on their blog. According to this, the United States has withdrawn nuclear weapons from the Royal Air Force Lakenheath air base, some 70 miles notheast of England.
This came as a series of withdrawals of nuclear weapons, following the withdrawals of those based at the U.S.A.F. Base Ramstein in Germany in 2005 and Greece in 2001.

This leaves another six European bases, two in Italy, one each in Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey where nuclear weapons are currently stored. Except one in Italy and the one in Turkey the nuclear weapons are stored on non- U.S.A.F. bases.
According to FAS this withdrawal happened at the same time as a U.S. State Department visit to Moscow Arguing about " who had done enough to reduce its non-startegic nuclear weapons.

The officially not announced withdrawal, was confirmed by U.S. government sources. It comes at a crucial moment in time. As On June 19th FAS reported on a U.S.A.F. investigation (Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures (BRR)published on February 8th, 2008), which found that

“host nation security at overseas nuclear-capable units varies from country to country in terms of personnel, facilities, and equipment.” The report describes that “inconsistencies in personnel, facilities, and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation were evident as the team traveled from site to site….Examples of areas noted in need of repair at several of the sites include support buildings, fencing, lighting, and security systems.”

According to FAS

"A news story on a USAF web site notes that the weapons security issues found by the BRR investigation were “at other bases,” suggesting that Büchel Air Base in Germany or Ghedi Torre Air Base in Italy were the problem. Even so, the BRR found problems at “most sites,” visits to Kleine Brogel and Volkel were described in the context of these findings."

The report showed that personnel, with as little as 9months experience was guarding the weapons. This would pose serious risks to the safety and security of nuclear weapons. Misuse due to improper training, handling or assembly of nuclear warheads poses one of the highest risk to nuclear weapons.

The report has triggered enormous protest by German politicians calling for a withdrawal of the nuclear weapons. Despite the Christ democrats (CDU), the coalition partner of the CDU, the SPD and the opposition have called for a withdrawal of the weapons. "The nuclear weapons are remnants of the Cold War and have to perish". The Foreign Policy Spokesperson of the Christ Democrats answered: " As long as nuclear weapons exist on this world, we cannot abdicate them. They protect us" [orginial article in German by Sueddeutsche Zeitung ]

The questions whether nuclear weapons are a useful deterrent for German national security is surely something worth discussing But, what the German politicians failed to acknowledge in this rhethorical blame game is the security related subtext of these findings. The obvious question behind these findings hints at the poor German Air Force command and control structure in place. After all the U.S. nuclear wwarheads in Germany are guarded, handled and deployed in a nuclear war by German personnel on a German Air Force Base. And they are not just unsafe since the BRR report came out, they have been so for quite some time. Obviously not only the warheads themselves are remnants of the Cold War the safety structures seem to be as well. If the answer of the German Bundestag will be to keep the nuclear warheads on German soil, the German Defense Ministry needs to address this issue rather fast.

Just at the same time a new declassified safety manual by Britains Ministry of Defence (MoD) raises concern about British submarine based nuclear warheads running risk of "popcorning" - (exploding one after the other).

The MoD manual states:

"the standard single-point design [keeps a nuclear weapon from detonation despite external shocks] may not be enough to prevent "popcorning" – a disastrous chain reaction of explosions that could occur as a result of warheads being stacked closely together."

As Sagan has shown in 1993, nuclear accidents are highly possible even in the U.S. system. Normal Accident theory has long challenged the safety of nuclear weapons and the above mentioned evidence unfortunately underlines these claims. The question I have in mind though is, if countries like the U.S. and other NATO member states are not able to provide adequate security and safety measures for their nuclear weapons arsenal, how much graver is the risk in non- high-tech countries, such as Pakistan or India?
I believe that South Asia runs an extraordinary high risk of accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and this could cause an accidental nuclear war in this region. Another question in mind, in this respect is certainly, why the U.S. is the only nation engaged in this region when it comes to discussions, establishment of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) or technology transfer with both countries. No matter what happens an accidental nuclear war or terrorist acquiring HEU for use in a - dirty bomb (RDD), Europe would most certainly be among the first to be hit by the repercussions and possible side effects of a nuclear war or nuclear terrorism. Yet Europe has only shown some interest in the discussion about Iran's nuclear program, but not on Pakistan's which happens to be Irans unstable neighbour and supplier of nuclear technology.

Zakaria urging Obama to address Iraq

In Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria published what Obama should say about Iraq in his campaign.

With the waning of American people on Iraq, Obama's campaign focuses heavily on the domestic issues. This might turn out to be a mistake. As Zakaria points out that Obama needs to address the issue of Iraq before a possible inauguration in January, simply because it will be the first foreign policy decision Obama will have to deal with.

Zakaria is basically giving a Obama speech, of what he should say in order to not turn Iraq into a problem during the rest of his campaign and after a possible inauguration. According to this Obama should not rest on his opposition to the Iraq war in 2002 but use " a different premise" than Mc Cain.

I believe that the Iraq War was a major strategic blunder. It diverted us from the battle against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan—the people who launched the attacks of 9/11 and who remain powerful and active today. We face threats in Iraq, but the two greatest ones, as General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have testified, are Al Qaeda (which is wounded but not dead) and Iran. Both are a direct consequence of the invasion. There was no Al Qaeda in Iraq before 2003, and Iran's influence has expanded massively since then.

Zakaria also calls for Obama to embrace Patreus strategy of talking to the enemies:

These reversals of strategy have had the effect of creating what General Petraeus calls 'breathing space' for political reconciliation. And he has always said that without political progress in Iraq, military efforts will not produce any lasting success.

Pointing out the responsibility of the U.S. president as standing up for "America's interests across the globe" this strategy would allow Obama to embrace some Republicans that were opposed to the war, but would feel betrayed by isolationism. Despite obvious rethorical terminology that Zakaria phrased out for Obama to use, he gave a valuable blueprint for Obama to use.
He phrases out differences between Mc Cain and Obama that Obama could use to his advantage. Being opposed to The Iraq war but embracing a Reconstruction of Iraq, looking somewhat like

an Iraq that is a functioning, federal democracy with a central government and an army able to tackle the bulk of challenges they face. [BUT] General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have themselves said that no matter what success we achieve, there will remain some Al Qaeda presence in Iraq and some Iranian influence, since Iran is a neighbor.

One of the interesting points I've seen was the possible side effects of using the "talk to the enemy strategy" This is not only valuable in Iraq and would make discussions towards reconstruction and somewhat stability. This would further point out differences in approach both to McCain and especially to the Bush administration. On the foreign policy side of his administration it could even become a Obama doctrine, putting
Obama could thus establish a foreign policy doctrine based on the use of soft power - a quality imagined by European academics for Europe in contrast to the United States. More emphasis on engagement with "enemies" would help containing them diplomatically, in order to step up for America's interests around the globe without having to rely on the military as first method of engagement, like it has been for the last 7 years.

Also check out Rodger's post on Iraq at the Duck of Minerva (where I found Zakaria's article)

Also check this LA Times article

Mozilla and Pentagon

If you haven't already read this article I recommend you to read David Eaves article on the mozilla firefox 3 download pledge map. He thus takes a limited look at the geopolitics of open source and finds some interesting correlations between the mozilla download map and the Pentagons map.

One of his most interesting findings is the status of Iran, which one would usually describe as isolated due to its regime.

Indeed, outside of the western world Iran has one of the highest download rates per capita. This would suggest Iran is quite well connected (and, I suspect, deeply mistrustful of MicroSoft). This should pose a challenge to Barnett’s thesis, in which connectedness should make a country safer to the international system

He also argues that open source programs helps transitional countries to 'increase their connectedness', as the cases of Eastern European and new EU countries shows explicitly.