Friday, October 16, 2009

News-flash 16th Oct 2009

Here a new feature and finally some input again. For the next 3 months, this page will feature a newsflash of U.S.- transatlantic news.

USA - domestic:
The Washington Post keeps up his coverage of the Health care debate with this piece on perks in the medicare advancement.
President Obama has proposed cutting more than $100 billion in subsidies over 10 years, a contentious component of health-care reform that will be fought in earnest as the bills move through Congress. But unlike some issues that touch off partisan sparring, Medicare Advantage has an unlikely band of bipartisan defenders who have already battled to restore $10 billion of the proposed reductions.


Dan Balz of the WP is taking a look at the implications of passing a law on Health Care on teh political system Asking questions such as
What then are the potential political implications for the president, his party and minority Republicans if the year ends with the president hosting a big signing ceremony to herald a new era for the American health care system? A big win for the Democrats? Despair among Republicans? Not surprisingly, Democrats and Republicans have sharply different expectations for what may happen.

Democrats assume substantial political benefits, both for getting the job done and for changes that they believe the public will see as improvements in the kind of health care coverage they have. They believe the passage of a health care bill will stand with other landmark achievements that have come under Democratic presidents, such as Social Security and Medicare.

Chris Kofinis, a Democratic strategist, predicts that, at a minimum, there will be a huge, short-term benefit for the president and his party. "Big social problems create big political and policy challenges, but also huge political payoffs," he said.
he further argues that this would show the democrats as the party to get a job done and the republicans as a "party on the sidelines".

Foreign Affairs offers an insightful view on how the U.S. can manage and balance the dollar and thus prevent a new crisis

Rothkopf over at Fp is comparing Obama to Carter asking if he is perhaps a Jimmy II.

John western at Duck of Minerva is pitching in on the debate on Obama and his decisionmaking style. offering insights like:
couple of points: First, in the post-World War II period most presidential decisions on the use of force have been relatively rapid decisions in response to particular crises or triggering events. Circumstances often dictated the necessity of quick decisions, e.g., Truman on Korea in June, 1950; Eisenhower on Lebanon; Reagan on Grenada; Bush 41 on Kuwait, Clinton on Kosovo. The situation in Afghanistan is an entirely different type of case. The situation is deteriorating, but there is no immediate time pressure. Second, as a result, we should be comparing apples to apples and we have had a number of cases in which presidents have had some luxury of having time to weigh a change in strategy or resources. What is interesting about many of these cases is how quickly and casually various presidents have made decisions on troop escalation or changes in strategic objectives without thorough analysis or consideration of various counterfactuals. [...] The bottom line is that there is no set of exigent circumstances dictating a decision today or tomorrow in Afghanistan. Obama has tasked his advisers and their staffs to do a thorough review of the strategic objectives and then a review of the various approaches to meet those objectives. The White House also has been clear that this will not be an open ended process and that Obama will make a decision by the end of this month. Ultimately history will judge Obama more on the outcome of his policy decision than the process, but for those of us who study decision making processes, this is about as sound as it gets.


U.S. - Afghanistan:
Ben Pershing of the WP looks into the deepening divide of Capitol Hill on the debate on Afghnaistan's Strategy.

In the span of just a few hours Tuesday, the chairmen of the House and Senate appropriations committees -- both Democrats -- made markedly different public statements on what President Obama should do next and whether more troops should be sent to bolster the war effort, with Sen. Daniel Inouye (Hawaii) voicing support for a new counterinsurgency strategy and Rep. David Obey (Wis.) reiterating his doubts about the entire venture. The split matters, since an increase in troops for Afghanistan would likely require the Obama administration to ask Congress for more money, and Inouye and Obey would need to agree. [...] While acknowledging the high cost of sending more troops, Inouye said: "If, after further consultation and deliberation we decide we need 40,000 more troops or 50,000 more troops in Afghanistan, that's what we'll send but much more discussion has to take place before a final decision on troop levels can be made."

Obey, meanwhile, delivered a speech in Stevens Point, Wis., where he made clear that he does not believe the national will exists for a big troop buildup, nor does he believe the U.S. has reliable partners in this fight.

"When you have to work through two weak reeds like the Pakistan government and Afghan government, it severely limits what you can accomplish," Obey said, according to the Wausau Daily Herald (as was flagged by "The Cable" blog on ForeignPolicy.com).


While Foreign Affairs is taking a look at how to win hearts and minds in a country used to fighting between western forces and the Taliban.

The light footprint strategy, which called for less rather than more foreign intervention and was sanctioned by the United Nations and the West following the collapse of the Taliban, failed to take into account that a post-Taliban Afghanistan was a country without institutions, leaving a leadership vacuum that could only be filled with the cadre of leaders that had emerged from 30 years of war -- fighting men who ruled by the power of the gun.

That rule has returned: Afghanistan today looks a lot like the Afghanistan of 2004, only a little bit worse. It also resembles the pre-Taliban Afghanistan of 1995 and 1996, when venturing on just about any highway was a risk and visiting a government office required a pocketful of bribes. The only difference between then and now is that the Afghan factions are no longer firing at each other and killing civilians who get caught in the middle. That is now being done by the Taliban and the international forces.[...] When the Taliban were driven from power, Afghans from across the country wanted to be allies of the international community, happy to see the back of the wretched Taliban regime. Eight years on, most people, including the young man from Musa Qala, are fed up. They see their country heading for destruction, led by corrupt and conniving leaders enabled by an international community unable to figure out the good guys from the bad guys.

Not long ago in Kabul, an Afghan friend who has stayed in his homeland through the communists, the mujahideen, and the Taliban, and who was always certain of a better day, told me that his optimism had run out. "I want out," he said. "You always wondered at how I could always be so optimistic, and now it's gone."



On the Af-Pak Channel on FP, David Fidler weighs in with a look at the debate around the strategy on Afghanistan in this piece.


USA - Cuba

Miami herald reports a new development in U.S. Cuban relations While keeping travel restrictions in place. Cuba allowed State Departmetn officials to visit jailed U.S. Cubans on the island.

Havana's decision to allow the prison visits ``reflect the benefits that could accrue to both countries as a result of better communications and, conversely, how our interests are poorly served when we don't communicate,'' said Bob Pastor, the top Cuban expert in Jimmy Carter's administration.

The State Department confirmed Wednesday that acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bisa Williams visited with jailed dual U.S.-Cuban citizens there during her trip to Cuba last month to discuss a possible resumption of direct mail services between the two nations. No further details on the visits were available.


USA - Russia
The NYTimes is reporting on Clintons visit to Moscow with this piece on her speech before 1000 students at Moscow State University.

Russia, she said, could best fulfill its potential by protecting basic freedoms.

“That’s why attacks on journalists and human rights activists are such a great concern, because it is a threat to progress,” she said. “The more open Russia will become, the more Russia will contribute.”

As if to illustrate that point, Mrs. Clinton then traveled from Moscow to Kazan, the 1,000-year-old capital of Tatarstan, a Russian republic where Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Roman Catholics live together peacefully, with none of the violent separatism that afflicts places like Chechnya.

Friday, May 8, 2009

Af-Pak - or how I learned to ignore the obvious!

Haven't been blogging for a while, primarily because of finishing up my studies, exams and writing an MA thesis.

But here I was sitting once again listening to some of the comments on Afghanistan by Nagl and Bacevich on the Newshour and couldn't help but compare it to Obama's AfPak White Paper, and the various comments on Abu Muqawama on the subject.

There is something seriously missing. It's not even a full year since Musharraf stepped down and handed "control" of the government to Zardari and everybody seemingly believes that he is in CONTROL? There is something called History and sometimes it's useful thinking about it. If a country has spent 33 of its 62 years of existence under direct military rule and pretty much the rest - especially between 1988 and 1999 - under very obvious military tutelage how can one actually believe that the military returned to the barracks?

That they haven't was obvious pretty quick after the appointment of Zardari to President of Pakistan, by such small facts as the ISI chief last year being appointed by Chief of Army Staff Kayani and not the Prime Minister, to which he is responsible under the 1973 constitution.

As the new strategy regarding the ``Af-Pak'' War of U.S. President Obama rightly emphasizes any attempt at pacifying Afghanistan will have to incorporate Pakistan. Yet, the``White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan'' discusses the problem of the Pakistani side of the ``Af-Pak'' War simply as a problem of governance, failing to acknowledge that Pakistan unlike Afghanistan HAS NOT been suffering from a 30 years long civil war, which left it with no political structures to build on, but rather boasts a complex, deeply engrained political structure, with the Army appearing as political and strategic nexus. Refusing to acknowledge the Army's complex interactions and its political and strategic interests will prove futile and only shatter the Af-Pak endeavor.

The military has been building up the Islamist factions, groups and parties to challenge the governments of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto's PPP and Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) inthe 90's were the same ones that used the Presidential rule of Article 58 (2) b to oust the above mentioned Prime Ministers several times.

The officer corps of Pakistan itself recruited primarily from Punjab (60-70%) and from the lower middle class is supporting upper middle class ideas as use the perks to the military to personally enrich themselves and become landlords, factory owners, managers and so on. The military basically owns or is involved in half of Pakistan's economic enterprises.(compare Ayesha Siddiqa's "Military Inc.")

The same military used the Taliban to gain "strategic depth" vis a vis India. India and Afghanistan have been historically close, but the Taliban offered the Pakistani Military a chance to reverse that trend, and change the strategic situation from having to fight on the Afghan and Indian front, both of which are the two longest borders of Pakistan. Afghanistan and India were quick to renew their historical friendship after the defeat of the Taliban, bringing Pakistan back into its old position of being sandwiched between two unfriendly countries.

The strategy of Pakistan for the last two decades (arguably since 1988) has been high intensity nuclear warfare to deter India's conventional supremacy and on the other hand low intensity insurgency warfare in Kashmir and Afghanistan, thus training Kashmiri and Afghan insurgents to fight Pakistan's wars.

And let's be clear, the military's role has been such because of the United States preferential treatment of the military vis a vis the civilians and not just since the Soviet invasion. Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haq, Musharraf have all used the United States for gaining military aid over economic aid.

So, why are we still talking about supporting the Zardari government in establishing control and governance in the FATA, NWFP while avknowledging their limited control. Why is anyone surprised to see the military fail against the Taliban, the group they have created for strategic purposes against Afghanistan and India and on which they still rely.

The reason behind Zardari's lack of control in the FATA, NWFP and parts of Baluchistan is not because of the Taliban, but because of his weak position vis a vis the Parent Guardian military. Supporting him to challenge the Taliban directly will always involve the military (as paramilitary and Police are all too often working for the Army and not oposing them). So support for Zardari can only work through civilian channels. The public must begin opposing the imperatives of the military: which are nicely summed up by the above mentioned AM post:

1. All of Pakistan's internal problems come from Indian activities run out of Afghanistan.
2. Pakistan's present "democratic" rulers are useless and owe their positions to America.
3. The real story is that the U.S. has failed in Afghanistan
4. London and Washington have a hidden agenda in cosying up to India.
5. The US wants to invade and dismember Pakistan


So the U.S. and the West needs to do exactly the opposite of what is stated above:
1. show that internal problems are homemade
2. Showing the usefulness of democratic leaders (which is tough if you take into account that most of the development work so far has been done by the military)
3. Showing the economic use of a stable Afghanistan for Pakistan
4. Keeping India at bay, or better supporting Indian/ Pakistani Confidence Building Measures other than Sport. Best, begin addressing Kashmir!
5. Persuade that the U.S. has no interest in invading Pakistan (despite this being a very very very ridiculous and deadly idea)

Friday, November 28, 2008

1998- 2008 renewed risks for nuclear confrontation in South Asia?

Writing on my thesis proposal (nuclear safety and security measures in South Asia and Iran) - which is due today - I gave the current situation in South Asia some thought.

Stratfor already compared the Mumbai attacks to the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, providing the conclusion that the late incident if pursued by Muslim terrorists with links to Pakistan could provoke a similar confrontation as following the 2001 attack. Stratfor argued that pressure by the U.S. and India could have destabilizing effects for Pakistan.

As I believe this possibility to be valid and also believe that such a confrontation will most certainly have nuclear implications. I see a different issue looming.

But first let's look at the destabilizing effect. A destabilized Pakistan is never a good idea, not for NATO and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and especially not for domestic concerns, but even more so for the risk of nuclear terrorism. As the example of the Soviet Union has shown physical protection systems based on manpower fail in times of destabilized governments. With ever increasing terrorist activities in the region and seeing that the attacks in mumbai seemed very well planned and tactically conceived, it is highly likely that a similar group could overrun a nuclear facility in Pakistan, should the country destabilize more.

This might be inhibited by close ties between the Army and especially ISI with Islamic insurgents, providing training and possibly equipment. Further the military so far has a vast economic presence in Pakistan gaining extra-budgetary means from private sector enterprises. Further the Army is currently still receiving U.S. military aid. Both sources of non- gouvermental income could keep the military cohesiveness, without the risk of it breaking apart, thus keeping physical protection systems intact.

Nevertheless, Pakistan is not immune to the financial crisis and shifts in strategic interest. Should the financial crisis hit enterprises of the Pakistan Army, the government most likely will not be able to bail any of the foundations and companies out anymore. Further a change in outlook on the Pakistan/ Afghanistan problem by the Obama administration, resulting in less military aid, could seriously challenge the cohesiveness of the Pakistan Army.

A different risk however stems from increased pressure by India, the U.S. and possibly other players in the region.
Pakistan as Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid
argue is believing to be facing an anti- Pakistan alliance, which includes the United States, India, Russia and several other nations.

Especially in light of the recent ratification of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal which makes India highly superior to Pakistan, Pakistan’s Army could change it’s defense interest Increased pursue of its ballistic missile program and a change in nuclear posture from an Launch after Attack posture to a Launch on Warning posture provide for an increasing risk in the possibility of nuclear confrontation.

Considering the fragile and failure prone Intelligence systems in Pakistan changing the nuclear posture is intensifying the risk for accidental, inadvertent or unauthorized use of these nuclear weapons.

After the renewed positive relations between India and Pakistan since the election of Zardari as President of Pakistan, yesterdays incident has the potential of plunging the relations into the brink of war.

If, Pakistani sources have been somehow involved into the attacks it reminds strikingly of 1998, when India- Pakistan 'Bus diplomacy' was at its height, and the military began the Kargil Operation behind Nawaz Sharif's back.