Af-Pak - or how I learned to ignore the obvious!

Haven't been blogging for a while, primarily because of finishing up my studies, exams and writing an MA thesis.

But here I was sitting once again listening to some of the comments on Afghanistan by Nagl and Bacevich on the Newshour and couldn't help but compare it to Obama's AfPak White Paper, and the various comments on Abu Muqawama on the subject.

There is something seriously missing. It's not even a full year since Musharraf stepped down and handed "control" of the government to Zardari and everybody seemingly believes that he is in CONTROL? There is something called History and sometimes it's useful thinking about it. If a country has spent 33 of its 62 years of existence under direct military rule and pretty much the rest - especially between 1988 and 1999 - under very obvious military tutelage how can one actually believe that the military returned to the barracks?

That they haven't was obvious pretty quick after the appointment of Zardari to President of Pakistan, by such small facts as the ISI chief last year being appointed by Chief of Army Staff Kayani and not the Prime Minister, to which he is responsible under the 1973 constitution.

As the new strategy regarding the ``Af-Pak'' War of U.S. President Obama rightly emphasizes any attempt at pacifying Afghanistan will have to incorporate Pakistan. Yet, the``White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan'' discusses the problem of the Pakistani side of the ``Af-Pak'' War simply as a problem of governance, failing to acknowledge that Pakistan unlike Afghanistan HAS NOT been suffering from a 30 years long civil war, which left it with no political structures to build on, but rather boasts a complex, deeply engrained political structure, with the Army appearing as political and strategic nexus. Refusing to acknowledge the Army's complex interactions and its political and strategic interests will prove futile and only shatter the Af-Pak endeavor.

The military has been building up the Islamist factions, groups and parties to challenge the governments of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto's PPP and Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) inthe 90's were the same ones that used the Presidential rule of Article 58 (2) b to oust the above mentioned Prime Ministers several times.

The officer corps of Pakistan itself recruited primarily from Punjab (60-70%) and from the lower middle class is supporting upper middle class ideas as use the perks to the military to personally enrich themselves and become landlords, factory owners, managers and so on. The military basically owns or is involved in half of Pakistan's economic enterprises.(compare Ayesha Siddiqa's "Military Inc.")

The same military used the Taliban to gain "strategic depth" vis a vis India. India and Afghanistan have been historically close, but the Taliban offered the Pakistani Military a chance to reverse that trend, and change the strategic situation from having to fight on the Afghan and Indian front, both of which are the two longest borders of Pakistan. Afghanistan and India were quick to renew their historical friendship after the defeat of the Taliban, bringing Pakistan back into its old position of being sandwiched between two unfriendly countries.

The strategy of Pakistan for the last two decades (arguably since 1988) has been high intensity nuclear warfare to deter India's conventional supremacy and on the other hand low intensity insurgency warfare in Kashmir and Afghanistan, thus training Kashmiri and Afghan insurgents to fight Pakistan's wars.

And let's be clear, the military's role has been such because of the United States preferential treatment of the military vis a vis the civilians and not just since the Soviet invasion. Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haq, Musharraf have all used the United States for gaining military aid over economic aid.

So, why are we still talking about supporting the Zardari government in establishing control and governance in the FATA, NWFP while avknowledging their limited control. Why is anyone surprised to see the military fail against the Taliban, the group they have created for strategic purposes against Afghanistan and India and on which they still rely.

The reason behind Zardari's lack of control in the FATA, NWFP and parts of Baluchistan is not because of the Taliban, but because of his weak position vis a vis the Parent Guardian military. Supporting him to challenge the Taliban directly will always involve the military (as paramilitary and Police are all too often working for the Army and not oposing them). So support for Zardari can only work through civilian channels. The public must begin opposing the imperatives of the military: which are nicely summed up by the above mentioned AM post:

1. All of Pakistan's internal problems come from Indian activities run out of Afghanistan.
2. Pakistan's present "democratic" rulers are useless and owe their positions to America.
3. The real story is that the U.S. has failed in Afghanistan
4. London and Washington have a hidden agenda in cosying up to India.
5. The US wants to invade and dismember Pakistan

So the U.S. and the West needs to do exactly the opposite of what is stated above:
1. show that internal problems are homemade
2. Showing the usefulness of democratic leaders (which is tough if you take into account that most of the development work so far has been done by the military)
3. Showing the economic use of a stable Afghanistan for Pakistan
4. Keeping India at bay, or better supporting Indian/ Pakistani Confidence Building Measures other than Sport. Best, begin addressing Kashmir!
5. Persuade that the U.S. has no interest in invading Pakistan (despite this being a very very very ridiculous and deadly idea)