Friday, November 28, 2008

1998- 2008 renewed risks for nuclear confrontation in South Asia?

Writing on my thesis proposal (nuclear safety and security measures in South Asia and Iran) - which is due today - I gave the current situation in South Asia some thought.

Stratfor already compared the Mumbai attacks to the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, providing the conclusion that the late incident if pursued by Muslim terrorists with links to Pakistan could provoke a similar confrontation as following the 2001 attack. Stratfor argued that pressure by the U.S. and India could have destabilizing effects for Pakistan.

As I believe this possibility to be valid and also believe that such a confrontation will most certainly have nuclear implications. I see a different issue looming.

But first let's look at the destabilizing effect. A destabilized Pakistan is never a good idea, not for NATO and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and especially not for domestic concerns, but even more so for the risk of nuclear terrorism. As the example of the Soviet Union has shown physical protection systems based on manpower fail in times of destabilized governments. With ever increasing terrorist activities in the region and seeing that the attacks in mumbai seemed very well planned and tactically conceived, it is highly likely that a similar group could overrun a nuclear facility in Pakistan, should the country destabilize more.

This might be inhibited by close ties between the Army and especially ISI with Islamic insurgents, providing training and possibly equipment. Further the military so far has a vast economic presence in Pakistan gaining extra-budgetary means from private sector enterprises. Further the Army is currently still receiving U.S. military aid. Both sources of non- gouvermental income could keep the military cohesiveness, without the risk of it breaking apart, thus keeping physical protection systems intact.

Nevertheless, Pakistan is not immune to the financial crisis and shifts in strategic interest. Should the financial crisis hit enterprises of the Pakistan Army, the government most likely will not be able to bail any of the foundations and companies out anymore. Further a change in outlook on the Pakistan/ Afghanistan problem by the Obama administration, resulting in less military aid, could seriously challenge the cohesiveness of the Pakistan Army.

A different risk however stems from increased pressure by India, the U.S. and possibly other players in the region.
Pakistan as Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid
argue is believing to be facing an anti- Pakistan alliance, which includes the United States, India, Russia and several other nations.

Especially in light of the recent ratification of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal which makes India highly superior to Pakistan, Pakistan’s Army could change it’s defense interest Increased pursue of its ballistic missile program and a change in nuclear posture from an Launch after Attack posture to a Launch on Warning posture provide for an increasing risk in the possibility of nuclear confrontation.

Considering the fragile and failure prone Intelligence systems in Pakistan changing the nuclear posture is intensifying the risk for accidental, inadvertent or unauthorized use of these nuclear weapons.

After the renewed positive relations between India and Pakistan since the election of Zardari as President of Pakistan, yesterdays incident has the potential of plunging the relations into the brink of war.

If, Pakistani sources have been somehow involved into the attacks it reminds strikingly of 1998, when India- Pakistan 'Bus diplomacy' was at its height, and the military began the Kargil Operation behind Nawaz Sharif's back.