1998- 2008 renewed risks for nuclear confrontation in South Asia?

Writing on my thesis proposal (nuclear safety and security measures in South Asia and Iran) - which is due today - I gave the current situation in South Asia some thought.

Stratfor already compared the Mumbai attacks to the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, providing the conclusion that the late incident if pursued by Muslim terrorists with links to Pakistan could provoke a similar confrontation as following the 2001 attack. Stratfor argued that pressure by the U.S. and India could have destabilizing effects for Pakistan.

As I believe this possibility to be valid and also believe that such a confrontation will most certainly have nuclear implications. I see a different issue looming.

But first let's look at the destabilizing effect. A destabilized Pakistan is never a good idea, not for NATO and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and especially not for domestic concerns, but even more so for the risk of nuclear terrorism. As the example of the Soviet Union has shown physical protection systems based on manpower fail in times of destabilized governments. With ever increasing terrorist activities in the region and seeing that the attacks in mumbai seemed very well planned and tactically conceived, it is highly likely that a similar group could overrun a nuclear facility in Pakistan, should the country destabilize more.

This might be inhibited by close ties between the Army and especially ISI with Islamic insurgents, providing training and possibly equipment. Further the military so far has a vast economic presence in Pakistan gaining extra-budgetary means from private sector enterprises. Further the Army is currently still receiving U.S. military aid. Both sources of non- gouvermental income could keep the military cohesiveness, without the risk of it breaking apart, thus keeping physical protection systems intact.

Nevertheless, Pakistan is not immune to the financial crisis and shifts in strategic interest. Should the financial crisis hit enterprises of the Pakistan Army, the government most likely will not be able to bail any of the foundations and companies out anymore. Further a change in outlook on the Pakistan/ Afghanistan problem by the Obama administration, resulting in less military aid, could seriously challenge the cohesiveness of the Pakistan Army.

A different risk however stems from increased pressure by India, the U.S. and possibly other players in the region.
Pakistan as Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid
argue is believing to be facing an anti- Pakistan alliance, which includes the United States, India, Russia and several other nations.

Especially in light of the recent ratification of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal which makes India highly superior to Pakistan, Pakistan’s Army could change it’s defense interest Increased pursue of its ballistic missile program and a change in nuclear posture from an Launch after Attack posture to a Launch on Warning posture provide for an increasing risk in the possibility of nuclear confrontation.

Considering the fragile and failure prone Intelligence systems in Pakistan changing the nuclear posture is intensifying the risk for accidental, inadvertent or unauthorized use of these nuclear weapons.

After the renewed positive relations between India and Pakistan since the election of Zardari as President of Pakistan, yesterdays incident has the potential of plunging the relations into the brink of war.

If, Pakistani sources have been somehow involved into the attacks it reminds strikingly of 1998, when India- Pakistan 'Bus diplomacy' was at its height, and the military began the Kargil Operation behind Nawaz Sharif's back.

Almost missed in the media - India's PM in Washington - change in nuclear race in South Asia???

Three topics seem to preoccupy the media outlets at this Friday the 26th. Either the bailout negotiations, and McCain/Obama's take in them. The Debate, or well in foreign policy there is the border situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan and especially US Forces being shot at by Pakistani forces. Pakistan's president discusses the latest incident with Condolezza Rice. Sure there is some more going on in the world today, but this seems to be pretty much the big stories.

But for all those interested in South Asia, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and maybe World Peace, there is a story that almost none of the big media outlets cover. India's Prime Minister was in Washington, discussing partly the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Though, Bush and Singh could not sign the deal yet, as Congress needs to ratify the deal both leaders hammered through in 2005. But, Congress might pass the deal in this Session. This will alter the strategic security situation in South Asia to a large extend. Especially in regards to Pakistan.

The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal will draw India and the U.S. closer as strategic partners, which is not a welcome change for Pakistan, which relies heavily on U.S. military help. But even more disturbing for India- Pakistan relationship, this would enable India to buy fissile material overseas, not having to rely on its own fissile material mines. India, which will then have enough fissile material for civilian used nuclear facilities, can use its indigenous resources for upgrading it to weapons grade plutonium, furthermore the spend fuel from the civilian reactors can also be enriched to weapons grade material, giving India the possibility to cash in twice.

This will further alter the assymetric character of the nuclear standoff in South Asia, eventually triggering a renewed nuclear Arms race. On top of that the Pakistani military might change its nuclear posture, to a Launch on Warning posture, leading to a mating of the warheads with the means of delivery. Thus increasing the risk of accidents or inadvertent and unauthorized launches of the nuclear weapons. Making thus increasing a risk of accidental nuclear war dramatically.

The civilian government in Pakistan urgently needs external and internal efforts to cut the Pakistani Army's grip on politics. A renewed nuclear step forward by India in this regard will only enhance the fears of the Pakistani Army that India is its number one threat, thus tightening a grip on the politicians, or maybe as in 1998 (Kargil crisis) begin a war without the civilian governments backing.

What Pakistan and South Asia would need right now is an effort for peace in the region. Getting a triadic peace agreement between the West, India and Pakistan going. A deal on no further aggressions and an effort to defuse the Kashmir problem. This will not only enhance Peace itself but also curb the Pakistani Army's iron grip, and thus help the democracy in Pakistan, which as a reward could only prove beneficial for Pakistan's northern frontier.

Islamabad bombing and change of strategy

Troy of abu muqawama posted on the Marriott bombing in Islamabad
and raised some interesting questions:

* In the wake of the most significant act of terrorism in the capital, will the new government’s approach to terrorism and militancy mirror the path taken by Musharraf following the Lal Masjid siege? A corollary to this question is, of course, how much control does the new government have over the military and the ISI? You can find one answer to that latter question here.

* Will this attack have any effect on Pakistani perceptions of the Tehrik-e-Taliban? The Mariott was certainly a “western” target, yet hundreds of Pakistanis (admittedly upper-class and/or government types) were reportedly breaking their Ramadan fast in the hotel’s restaurants. Could this have an effect on Pakistani public opinion, which has been rather ambivalent about the domestic danger posed by the Pakistani Taliban?

* What, if any, is the cause and effect relationship with the recent spate of cross border attacks by the U.S. on militant base areas inside Pakistan? Could this attack indicate that the raids, controversial though they may be, are actually having enough of an effect that the Pakistani Taliban feel the need to escalate their violence in an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the government to halt the practice?

Undoubtedly the questions have merit, yet I find them a bit narrow. The new civilian government as much as Bhutto and Sharif before, has no real power over the military. The military is very much the only structured institution in Pakistan and sees itself despite four failed attempts as the only force capable of ruling the country.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi wrote an interesting piece on the effects of U.S. cross border interventions in an editorial in the Daily Times

"If the military comes to the conclusion that the civilian government is not able to adopt effective diplomatic measures, it may either mount pressure to push the government to action, change civilian leaders in power, or completely displace the civilian government."

Lacking the support of the Chief of Army Staff Kayani, Zardari has no grip on the military. Any support for the overall COIN mission in the NWFP by Zardari can only be rhetorical. Just as much as his interest in clamping down on terrorists. The support on the ground by Pakistani troops comes only after the military establishments choosing. To clamp down on domestic and foreign terrorists inside Pakistan Zardari needs to either establish well functioning relationships with the military (a hard task by itself) or try to cut down the military's influence by establishing formal civil military relations. (Almost impossible and a very loooooong- term task)

Further, if I'm not mistaken, no terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the attacks yet. Pakistan has a lot of Islamist groups and a lot Islamist terrorist cells. Clearly some have contact to the Taliban and or Al Qaeda due to the close connections with ISI. The Taliban are strategically bound in the NWFP. Any Islamist terrorist group can be responsible for this attack. And the Pakistani public is well aware of the threat of terrorism, especially since Benazir Bhutto's assasination. (In my eyes the sole reason Zardari was elected). Also how much intel is available yet that the attack was not directed at the Government buildings where Zardari dined with leaders of government?

The third question leads us to a different question. What will be the gains of U.S. operations conducted in the NWFP? I would suggest that any effect of the U.S. military in Pakistan will be short term and will only have the long term effects of an increase in Anti- American sentiments. Despite Pakistan's long term alliance and reliance with the U.S. the Pakistanis have always followed their own strategic golas and while cashing in on all of the offers by the U.S. in military and development aid, were reluctant to come up with their side of the agreements. The Pakistani establishing, while relying on the U.S. and keeping close contact did not hinder public anti U.S. rallies domestically. Quite to the contrary, while sending troops to Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm many military and government leaders were in fact pro Saddam. Openly mistreating Pakistan's sovereignty will further increase this anti- U.S. sentiment in the Pakistani public and in return could and most certainly will after time have the above quoted effect of the military establishment trying to push Zardari out of government and might even take over.

As Stephen Cohen noted in his book: “The idea of Pakistan”:

The events of September 11 affected Pakistan more than any other Muslim state except Afghanistan, yet prompted little domestic change."

The future of Pakistan and Afghanistan are intermingled and both can't be dealt with by military means. To deal with the insurgency in Afghanistan will mean the U.S. and the West will have to adopt different strategies for Pakistan:

- The U.S. needs to stop the support of the Pakistan military. The continuing U.S. support for Pakistani military has already led to as Husaim Haqqani notes in "Pakistan between Mosque and Military" the overestimation of the Pakistani Army's power potential and to a rentier state mentality.

- Aid programs must be directed at economic and democratic development in Pakistan. Until the 2002 election no Islamist party could gain more than 10% of the actual votes (Both Sharif and Bhutto were ousted in that election), thus showing that the Pakistani public is despite islamist identity voting secular parties addressing social issues.

- The U.S. needs to step up in an effort to address Pakistani threat perceptions. The number one external threat for the Pakistani public has been for years the fear of an Indian attack. (The nuclear program and the covert operations against Indian territory in Afghanistan or Kahsmir are meant to deter India.) In order to minimize Pakistani military influence and change the regional set up. Pakistan and India need to agree on Confidence Building Measures and first and foremost on a no attack agreement. In the long run Kashmir needs to be discussed.

As long as the Pakistani military establishment keeps the country hijacked, the region will stay unstable at best and going down a spiral of violence at worst. To change the domestic set up of Pakistan is critically intermingled with success in Afghanistan.

Update: C. Raja Mohan wrote a pretty neat piece on Bush's and Pakistan's future worth reading.

As the Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili said in a interview with the BBC, pleading for international help and agreeing to a immediate ceasefire, in his background was not only Georgia's flag and the official Governments flag on his left but that of the European Union on his right.

Georgia is not yet a member of the EU, but has interest in becoming a member.

The EU on Georgia- EU relations:

The ENP Action Plan endorsed by the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council of 14 November 2006 aims at fulfilling the provisions of the PCA and contributing to a closer relationship with Georgia, involving a significant degree of economic integration and deepening the political co-operation. It covers a period of five years.

Is Saakashvili using the flag in order to call on the EU among all for help?

Russian troop level in South Ossetia's neighbourhood

On several blogs, the question arose why Russian troops could move so fast into South Ossetia. This could be interpreted as Russian troops waiting for Georgia to take the bait and move into South Ossetia. I tried to find a map of Russian military installations. All I found was the above one on here.

According to this website there's a troop level of 185'000 Air Force troops and 322'000 Ground troops, plus some more logistics and other the Black Sea fleet in the North Caucasus Military District. Most divisions have taken part in the Chechen wars.

Alone in Vladikavkaz just some 30miles across the border of South Ossetia has almost 7000 troops of which 223 are tank troops and more than 1000 troops in Artillery units.

The close proximity to South Ossetia and the huge amount of armoured troops could make a quick reaction and troop deployment within 12hrs to South Ossetia possible.

Reality imitating game?? No not the olympics...

As news come rolling in about Russia and Georgia, and who has started or reacted to what I am being reminded of this:

Eastern Europe, 2008
The world teeters on the brink of war. Radical ultranationalists have seized power in Moscow - their goal, the reestablishment of the old Soviet empire. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan - one by one the nearby independent republics slip back into the Russian orbit. Russian tanks sit in the Caucasus Mountains and the Baltic forests, poised to strike to the south and east. The world hold ots breath, and waits.
For one small group of elite soldiers, the war has already begun: U.S. Special Forces Group 5, First Battalion, D Company. Deployed on peacekeping duty to the Republic of Georgia in the Caucasus, this handful of Green Berets represents the very tip of the spear. They call themselves "The Ghosts"

seehere

Back in 2003, I suppose it was a nice idea of the geeks behind Ghost Recon to set a fictive war in 2008 between Georgia and Russia, as the backdrop of a computer game. Unfortunately reality seems to have copied at least part of the game as of today. Still not convinced? The missions at least at the beginning of the game, play in South Ossetia.

But before one condemns my comparison, read Daniel Nexon's thoughts, or Stratfor:

Given the speed with which the Russians reacted to Georgia’s incursion into South Ossetia, Moscow was clearly ready to intervene. We suspect the Georgians were set up for this in some way, but at this point the buildup to the conflict no longer matters. What matters is the message that Russia is sending to the West.

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev summed this message up best: “Historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus.”

Strategically, we said Russia would respond to Kosovo’s independence, and they have. Russia is now declaring the Caucasus to be part of its sphere of influence. We have spoken for months of how Russia would find a window of opportunity to redefine the region. This is happening now.

Cuba Crisis relived - but without Cuba??

As this article reports Russia is threatening the West with deployment of Russian Bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons to Cuba.

Despite the fact that this could be just mere rhetoric by the Russians as suggested in any of these articles, the world is no longer 1962. Again, power dynamics make their play into the way we discuss this issue. And it seems as if Russia vs. the West is all up again, but how much are comments like this worth?

I suppose the Kreml's comments can be seen as hot air for a number of reasons. First Russia's interior rhetorical dynamics. Some thoughts to this have been made at the Duck and here. Second? I doubt the strategic advantage of bombers?? They are only faster deployed, but also faster shot down.

Thirdly and most importantly is the country that should be the staging and deployment point for those bombers. CUBA?? Somebody ever heard the name of this country? YES in 1962 it was the country where the missiles were supposed to be deployed.

Cuba was reluctantly lulled into the scheme in 1962 by the Soviets, by arguing for the weapons as a security guarantee against U.S. invasion. Cuba was at the down end of the discussions and found its own concerns sadly disappointed and not even heard in the discussions on withdrawal of the weapons. Metaphorically Fidel was "the Mouse" bleeping unheard from his little island, while the superpowers discussed their differences. I doubt his brother Raoul has any interest in following his brothers footsteps. Especially now that Cuba finally recovers from the damage done by the recession that began when the Soviets left Cuba in the 90's. The Cuban's won't be buying in on this scheme again, despite their problematic (to say the least) situation with the U.S..

For Cuba normalization ismore like the path to go than trying to play with the superpowers. Tourism (mainly with Canada and Germany) seems like the 'strategic' partnership that Cuba is seeking, not nuclear deterrence.


The question is why is nobody asking if Cuba is interested in a second October crisis (as the Cubans call it)?

Power dynamics?? Yeah I guess, as shown above. But maybe the reason that U.S. Americans have no clue about Cuba and tend to forget that the country moved past 1962 can also be found in the mere fact that the U.S. government upholds the embargo, keeping anybody with a U.S. passport from traveling those 90miles south of Florida and seeing the country with their own eyes.

Indo- U.S. nuclear deal halted

As Reuters reports the Indo- U.S. nuclear deal will not be ratified by Congress as planned before January.

The U.S. Congress will not have time to approve a landmark civilian nuclear agreement with India at the center of a bitter Indian political row, a key U.S. lawmaker on South Asian affairs said on Tuesday.

The deal was meant to bring India and the U.S. closer together in its nuclear power and would have had serious implications for South Asia and the World.


The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has more facets: On the one hand it gives India the chance to use U.S. nuclear fuel, it basically formally acknowledges India as a nuclear weapons states without having signed the NPT and gives the U.S. in return a little more leverage over India's nuclear program, by putting civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. This certainly is a positive effect, since it would make India a safer ground fro nuclear technology, helping to achieve at least a minimum level of safety and security.

But it also gives India the chance to end its heavy reliance on their own uranium sources, which could be used to produce weapons grade uranium and plutonium in military and strategic reactors that won't be under safeguards.

An Indian official announced after the U.S.-India deal in 2005: “The truth is we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end of 2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear program. 10 India ran out of uranium and putting nuclear reactors under safeguards opens India to the international nuclear fuel cycle thus providing it access to uranium. But most of the reactors are not going to be under safeguards until 2010 or 2014, from the spend fuel those civilian facilities produce, India could produce from 2007 about 4274 kg reactor grade plutonium. “Meanwhile the military reactors could keep producing 1250 kg of plutonium a year. (paragraph copied from own paper)

Especially the later point of gaining the ability to produce weapons grade plutonium from spend fuel, will give India a critical advantage over its adversary Pakistan, which already struggles to follow up in this neighbour nuclear arms race.

Stephen Cohen (Brookings) and Lisa Curtis (Heritage Foundation) said a setback to the nuclear deal would not derail bilateral ties. But in addition to the time needed for a transition to a new U.S. administration, Bush's successor might pause before going to bat for India again.

In fact the Indo- U.S. nuclear deal might pause not only until spring next year, but maybe even until Bush's predecessor got accustomed to dealing with South Asia and having understood the importance of this issue. More urgent policy decisions (Iraq, taxes, health care) will most likely postpone decisions on South Asia for a while.

This does not necessarily have to be negative for South Asia. Despite the risks of nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities being unsafe and not secured enough, in terms of Confidence Building Measures with Pakistan, a delay of tis deal could make time for a deal being hammered out with Pakistan, bringing all three parties on a table to halt the increasing speed of the South Asian nuclear arms race.

WOW - Big brother going overboard with parents in the UK!

According to this telegraph article British parents are prohibited from attending their kids school plays, parties or other activities if they are not vetted by the Criminal Records Bureau (CBR)

The system of vetting adults who work with children was introduced in 2002 in the aftermath of the horrific abduction and murder of two schoolgirls in Soham. But most parents still don't realise that it has since expanded arbitrarily and can encompass virtually any adult who wishes to come in to contact with children.

So if you are not licensed by the CRB, don't be surprised if you are discouraged from attending your child's activities. What astonished Alka was that so many parents have come to accept such intrusive vetting as a fact of life.
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She says that many parents agreed that the vetting of parents at a school disco was unnecessary, while some described it as "just one of those daft excessive things" - yet they were prepared to tolerate it. One nursery worker informed me that she is quitting her chosen vocation because "I cannot be myself in this job".

"I no longer feel comfortable about acting on my gut feelings and cuddling and reassuring a distressed infant," she says. As far as she was concerned, if she could no longer cuddle the children in her charge and was forced to minimise physical contact with them, then her job had become "weird".

So, now parents - the primary guardian of their kids - are notbasically not trusted anymore to take care or guard their kids. Of course this bill has some good sides, trying to keep kids from being kidnapped and worse, but... are kids really in danger at school activities (while parents attend?) In my logic, a kid whose parents are not vetted and are therefore prohibited from those activities runs higher risks to being obducted (b/c at all this chaos at class activities the teacher can't look after all of the kids running and bustling around)

A couple of years I worked voluntarily in a nursing home in Germany and experienced a new bill being introduced in Germany making caring and nursing in nursing homes much more restricted. The same side effects came up... While trying to make a good job and taking good care of old people, nurses had to cross boundaries which if they would come out would get them sentenced.

Is this institutionalization of such jobs and its grasp into private realms really necessary to protect?? Or are there other ways?? Teachers, nurses or kindergarten teacher are already the number one social group being affected by burn out syndrom - if now they permanently have to worry about prosecution, will they keep coming to work?

Who's leading who in Iran??

As reported by one of my not so favorite news agencies: Xinhua. But I'll be coming to the issue of China soon enough.
Nevertheless, Commander of Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari warned Israel on Saturday in an Iranian newspaper:

Israel "is completely within the range of the Islamic republic's missiles" and it cannot confront Iran's missile power, Jafari told Iran's Jam-e Jam newspaper.

"The enemy possibly wants to delay our nuclear activities by attacking our nuclear sites, but any interruption would be very short since Iranian scientific ability is different from that of Syria and Iraq," he said.

As I already blogged yesterday:

"We advise U.S. officials to be careful not to face another tragedy," Mohammed Hejazi, an official in the military's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Wednesday, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. "If you want to move toward Iran, make sure you bring walking sticks and artificial legs because if you come, you will not have any legs to return on."

Interestingly enough no major Western media outlet seems to recognize the fact how factionalized the Iranian state is.

It must be noted that the Revolutionary Guard is only a part of the Military establishment, but the fact that the Revolutionary Guard issues warnings towards Israel and the U.S. by themselves shows how split the power set up is in Iran.

The head of state is Ali Hoseini-Khameini, the Grand Ayatollah (since 4 June 1989), he's also the chief of staff when it comes to a war. The head of government: President Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD (since 3 August 2005). Traditionally the Ayatollah is opposed to the President and this could be seen in recent months. The Revolutionary Guard seems to be closer to the Grand Ayatollah but at the moment it seems a bit unclear on which side of the wall the Revolutionary Guard will come down. Another faction that always seems to have some say in political matters is the Ulama the clergy (appointing the Grand Ayatollah and thus holding a very influential part in politics).

Anyways the interesting fact here is that Iran in fact is not one homogeneous country. The Revolutionary Guard, the Grand Ayatollah, the President all have own interests. It might be interesting to follow Iran's future statements in this light, instead of believing in the myth of a monolithic state.

Thanks to my web designer!

I just wanted to thank my friend Sidra Mahmood for designing the new template of this Blog. Thank you very much you did a great job!

Disarmament, Withdrawal and NPT - necessary or obsolete?

Solana, Iran and Harmon

Seemingly the topic of the week is set. Javier Solana the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy spoke at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on Wednesday June 25th.

Some paragrahps from his speech that can be found here

"Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are enormous challenges for the international community."

"But, if truth be told, the last ten years have been a "lost decade". When the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke to you at the opening of the 2008 session, he made clear that he was deeply troubled by the lack of progress. I fully share his view. It is puzzling that during an entire decade and despite enormous efforts, there is still no agreement even on the question of how to address the issues and in which order. "

All this talks of dismarmanent and withdrawal in Europe is framed with by Iran's latest comments on their nuclear enrichment program. The Islamic Republic once again pressures the West to engage in discussion before its too late.

"Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran's parliament and a former nuclear negotiator, said there was "only a little time left" for talks before Iran would make unspecified moves that the West would regret."

"Don't provoke Iran otherwise you will face a done deal that will block the path of your return to a compromise with Iran," Larijani told an open session of the parliament broadcast live on state radio Wednesday.

"We advise U.S. officials to be careful not to face another tragedy," Mohammed Hejazi, an official in the military's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Wednesday, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. "If you want to move toward Iran, make sure you bring walking sticks and artificial legs because if you come, you will not have any legs to return on."

"The United States has to realize that they cannot resolve all their problems through aggression and force," Khatami said at a conference in Oslo promoting dialogue between the Islamic world and the West.

With that Khatami unfortunately is right on. The dire warnings need to be seen in the context of a Israeli military exercise, which were claimed by U.S. officials as message to Iran.

"Even if Iran's nuclear facilities are totally destroyed — a possibility that is precisely zero — it will easily be revived within a short period of time, but with the difference that it may prompt a fundamental reconsideration in intentions," the daily Kayhan said in an editorial. "

Especially the later comment is interesting as Iran always claimed that the Enrichment of uranium would only be for civilian intentions. This does certainly not mean that despite their claims weaponizing the nuclear program wasn't the overall hidden agenda of Iran's leadership. But ironically the the rethoric of a preemptive war against Iran if they do not stop weaponizing, has granted the Islamic Republic with a preliminary almost legal justification for doing just that. They can even do it publically.

More on this can be found here and here

Despite Solana's trust in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the vehicle for disarmament there are voices that raise concern about the usefulness of the NPT . Congresswoman Harmon wrote on June 20th in the Wall Street Journal, arguing rightly so, that the NPT standards are obsolete in a world where North Korea and Iran can proliferate under the umbrella of the NPT.

Today's legal regime is no match for the wide dissemination of nuclear technology. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) standards are obsolete, and the growth in the sheer number of nuclear facilities world-wide has made it difficult for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to achieve its mission.

Moreover, the NPT cuts most of the world out of the nuclear weapons club. It grandfathered in states that had nuclear weapons before 1967, and said that only they could keep them. Given the skyrocketing demand for alternatives to oil, we have to expect that more countries will want to develop nuclear energy. We need a system that allows states to pursue nuclear energy but prevents them from developing nuclear weapons under the radar.

A more promising approach might be to create an international consortium of fuel centers that provide enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel, and end-to-end oversight of nuclear resources. Driven by market demand, private companies could operate facilities with IAEA oversight, and participating states would agree not to engage in independent enriching and reprocessing. Material would be purchased from the international market, thereby creating supply assurance for nations who fear being denied fuel.

This concept is a private-sector version of the International Nuclear Fuel Authority envisioned by Sens. Richard Lugar and Evan Bayh, and could borrow from the low-enriched uranium "emergency" stockpile concept proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Harmon raises some interesting questions and even more so possible ways to deal with the problem.

At least some good news can be read in the last few days:
In the case of North Korea it seems that after years of verbal assaults and sanctions by the Bush Administration the last two years have proven fruitful, As yesterday North Korea made the symbolic act of destroying the cooling tower at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang. The facility has been used for enrichment of plutonium. Unfortunately the critics may be right, it came too late, since North Korea had enough time to produce enough weapons grade plutonium for nuclear warheads, and test a detonation and the missiles to deliver the warheads. Yet it does show a major achievement in diplomatic relations between the two countries, and maybe even a shift in U.S. foreign policy, one that the following president should embrace and enhance. (See post on Zakaria and Obama)
Nice blog on this topic also on: Duck of Minerva

Nuke withdrawal and safety - glance at Europe's nuclear arsenal

Nuclear weapons and their Security and Safety in the U.K., Europe.

This topic will become somewhat of a series on this Blog, due to my personal academic interest in this field.

Yesterday June 26th the Federation of American Scientists reported about the quiet withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from bases in England on their blog. According to this, the United States has withdrawn nuclear weapons from the Royal Air Force Lakenheath air base, some 70 miles notheast of England.
This came as a series of withdrawals of nuclear weapons, following the withdrawals of those based at the U.S.A.F. Base Ramstein in Germany in 2005 and Greece in 2001.

This leaves another six European bases, two in Italy, one each in Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey where nuclear weapons are currently stored. Except one in Italy and the one in Turkey the nuclear weapons are stored on non- U.S.A.F. bases.
According to FAS this withdrawal happened at the same time as a U.S. State Department visit to Moscow Arguing about " who had done enough to reduce its non-startegic nuclear weapons.

The officially not announced withdrawal, was confirmed by U.S. government sources. It comes at a crucial moment in time. As On June 19th FAS reported on a U.S.A.F. investigation (Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures (BRR)published on February 8th, 2008), which found that

“host nation security at overseas nuclear-capable units varies from country to country in terms of personnel, facilities, and equipment.” The report describes that “inconsistencies in personnel, facilities, and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation were evident as the team traveled from site to site….Examples of areas noted in need of repair at several of the sites include support buildings, fencing, lighting, and security systems.”

According to FAS

"A news story on a USAF web site notes that the weapons security issues found by the BRR investigation were “at other bases,” suggesting that Büchel Air Base in Germany or Ghedi Torre Air Base in Italy were the problem. Even so, the BRR found problems at “most sites,” visits to Kleine Brogel and Volkel were described in the context of these findings."

The report showed that personnel, with as little as 9months experience was guarding the weapons. This would pose serious risks to the safety and security of nuclear weapons. Misuse due to improper training, handling or assembly of nuclear warheads poses one of the highest risk to nuclear weapons.

The report has triggered enormous protest by German politicians calling for a withdrawal of the nuclear weapons. Despite the Christ democrats (CDU), the coalition partner of the CDU, the SPD and the opposition have called for a withdrawal of the weapons. "The nuclear weapons are remnants of the Cold War and have to perish". The Foreign Policy Spokesperson of the Christ Democrats answered: " As long as nuclear weapons exist on this world, we cannot abdicate them. They protect us" [orginial article in German by Sueddeutsche Zeitung ]

The questions whether nuclear weapons are a useful deterrent for German national security is surely something worth discussing But, what the German politicians failed to acknowledge in this rhethorical blame game is the security related subtext of these findings. The obvious question behind these findings hints at the poor German Air Force command and control structure in place. After all the U.S. nuclear wwarheads in Germany are guarded, handled and deployed in a nuclear war by German personnel on a German Air Force Base. And they are not just unsafe since the BRR report came out, they have been so for quite some time. Obviously not only the warheads themselves are remnants of the Cold War the safety structures seem to be as well. If the answer of the German Bundestag will be to keep the nuclear warheads on German soil, the German Defense Ministry needs to address this issue rather fast.

Just at the same time a new declassified safety manual by Britains Ministry of Defence (MoD) raises concern about British submarine based nuclear warheads running risk of "popcorning" - (exploding one after the other).

The MoD manual states:

"the standard single-point design [keeps a nuclear weapon from detonation despite external shocks] may not be enough to prevent "popcorning" – a disastrous chain reaction of explosions that could occur as a result of warheads being stacked closely together."

As Sagan has shown in 1993, nuclear accidents are highly possible even in the U.S. system. Normal Accident theory has long challenged the safety of nuclear weapons and the above mentioned evidence unfortunately underlines these claims. The question I have in mind though is, if countries like the U.S. and other NATO member states are not able to provide adequate security and safety measures for their nuclear weapons arsenal, how much graver is the risk in non- high-tech countries, such as Pakistan or India?
I believe that South Asia runs an extraordinary high risk of accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and this could cause an accidental nuclear war in this region. Another question in mind, in this respect is certainly, why the U.S. is the only nation engaged in this region when it comes to discussions, establishment of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) or technology transfer with both countries. No matter what happens an accidental nuclear war or terrorist acquiring HEU for use in a - dirty bomb (RDD), Europe would most certainly be among the first to be hit by the repercussions and possible side effects of a nuclear war or nuclear terrorism. Yet Europe has only shown some interest in the discussion about Iran's nuclear program, but not on Pakistan's which happens to be Irans unstable neighbour and supplier of nuclear technology.

Zakaria urging Obama to address Iraq

In Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria published what Obama should say about Iraq in his campaign.

With the waning of American people on Iraq, Obama's campaign focuses heavily on the domestic issues. This might turn out to be a mistake. As Zakaria points out that Obama needs to address the issue of Iraq before a possible inauguration in January, simply because it will be the first foreign policy decision Obama will have to deal with.

Zakaria is basically giving a Obama speech, of what he should say in order to not turn Iraq into a problem during the rest of his campaign and after a possible inauguration. According to this Obama should not rest on his opposition to the Iraq war in 2002 but use " a different premise" than Mc Cain.

I believe that the Iraq War was a major strategic blunder. It diverted us from the battle against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan—the people who launched the attacks of 9/11 and who remain powerful and active today. We face threats in Iraq, but the two greatest ones, as General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have testified, are Al Qaeda (which is wounded but not dead) and Iran. Both are a direct consequence of the invasion. There was no Al Qaeda in Iraq before 2003, and Iran's influence has expanded massively since then.

Zakaria also calls for Obama to embrace Patreus strategy of talking to the enemies:

These reversals of strategy have had the effect of creating what General Petraeus calls 'breathing space' for political reconciliation. And he has always said that without political progress in Iraq, military efforts will not produce any lasting success.

Pointing out the responsibility of the U.S. president as standing up for "America's interests across the globe" this strategy would allow Obama to embrace some Republicans that were opposed to the war, but would feel betrayed by isolationism. Despite obvious rethorical terminology that Zakaria phrased out for Obama to use, he gave a valuable blueprint for Obama to use.
He phrases out differences between Mc Cain and Obama that Obama could use to his advantage. Being opposed to The Iraq war but embracing a Reconstruction of Iraq, looking somewhat like

an Iraq that is a functioning, federal democracy with a central government and an army able to tackle the bulk of challenges they face. [BUT] General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have themselves said that no matter what success we achieve, there will remain some Al Qaeda presence in Iraq and some Iranian influence, since Iran is a neighbor.

One of the interesting points I've seen was the possible side effects of using the "talk to the enemy strategy" This is not only valuable in Iraq and would make discussions towards reconstruction and somewhat stability. This would further point out differences in approach both to McCain and especially to the Bush administration. On the foreign policy side of his administration it could even become a Obama doctrine, putting
Obama could thus establish a foreign policy doctrine based on the use of soft power - a quality imagined by European academics for Europe in contrast to the United States. More emphasis on engagement with "enemies" would help containing them diplomatically, in order to step up for America's interests around the globe without having to rely on the military as first method of engagement, like it has been for the last 7 years.

Also check out Rodger's post on Iraq at the Duck of Minerva (where I found Zakaria's article)

Also check this LA Times article

Mozilla and Pentagon

If you haven't already read this article I recommend you to read David Eaves article on the mozilla firefox 3 download pledge map. He thus takes a limited look at the geopolitics of open source and finds some interesting correlations between the mozilla download map and the Pentagons map.

One of his most interesting findings is the status of Iran, which one would usually describe as isolated due to its regime.

Indeed, outside of the western world Iran has one of the highest download rates per capita. This would suggest Iran is quite well connected (and, I suspect, deeply mistrustful of MicroSoft). This should pose a challenge to Barnett’s thesis, in which connectedness should make a country safer to the international system

He also argues that open source programs helps transitional countries to 'increase their connectedness', as the cases of Eastern European and new EU countries shows explicitly.